Coalition Dynamics Model
Two state variables evolve over time: x (the share of the population supporting an exclusionary coalition) and t (institutional trust / civic confidence). Both are bounded to [0, 1].
dtdx=Δt⋅x(1−x)(πE−πI)+Δt⋅noise dtdt=Δt⋅(0.55R+0.45C+0.25N−0.55P−0.65x−0.45S−0.2θ) The x(1−x) factor ensures replicator dynamics: change is fastest at intermediate shares and stalls near the boundaries. The payoff differential πE−πI determines whether exclusionary or inclusive support grows.
Attractor Classes
- Inclusive (x<0.2) — exclusionary support is marginal; trust-building feedbacks dominate.
- Mixed (0.2≤x≤0.8) — neither coalition dominates; system is in a contested or transitional zone.
- Exclusionary (x>0.8) — exclusionary politics dominate; trust erodes in a self-reinforcing cycle.
Parameters
- S (Stress) — economic/security shocks that raise threat salience.
- D (Diversity) — salience of group boundaries in this toy model.
- P (Polarization) — fragmented information space; amplifies perceived threat.
- N (Norms) — rule-of-law / rights constraints that raise the cost of exclusion.
- C (Contact) — bridging social capital; reduces perceived threat.
- R (Redistribution) — material inclusion; increases trust and inclusive payoff.
- O (Opportunism) — elite identity entrepreneurship; strengthens exclusionary narrative feedback.
Notes
- This is a toy model. Use it to reason about feedback loops and basins, not to estimate real-world quantities.
- Presets are illustrative, not empirically calibrated. For data-grounded presets, map real indicators into S/D/P/N/C/R/O.
- The basin map can be computationally expensive at high grid resolutions. Lower the grid setting if interaction feels slow.